Guardian t-mining · Pearl Swap

enderpearl.ai/guardian

We are one of three signers. Moving anything takes two.

Pearl Swap holds native PRL in an escrow on Pearl and the PRL token supply in a treasury on Hyperliquid. Both need two signatures from three guardians, run by different operators on their own servers. Ours is t-mining. The other two are Deep Nacre’s mc-mining and Pearl Swap’s pearl-swap.

Guardian
t-mining. Its own record, read live
Right now
Checking reading from your browser
Operator
Enderpearl, independent. Not part of Pearl Research Labs or Pearl Swap.
Threshold
2 of 3, enforced by Pearl and by Hyperliquid.
Configuration
Epoch 1, ca7ec3a5…, since 25 Sep 2026.
Networks
Pearl testnet2 and Hyperliquid testnet. Test networks only, for now.
The route of one payment, drawn on the tile. The row is where the PRL came from. The column is the one account it may go to, fixed by cryptography before anything moves. C = A·B

The questions we expect from holders, auditors and counsel.

Can Enderpearl freeze or move funds?

Move them, no. Hold up new payouts, yes, like any guardian.

Moving anything takes two signatures from three keys, and each chain enforces that. All three guardians prepare every payout, so any one of them, ours included, can hold up new payouts by refusing. None can move funds alone, and escrowed funds stay where they are.

What if we are compelled?

We still hold one key of three.

We cannot hand over more than one signature, and one signature is not a spend. The other two guardians still check every payment against their own view, and sign only an exact match.

What if we are hacked?

An attacker gets one signature.

One compromised guardian cannot move funds. To move anything, an attacker holding our server would still need a second guardian. We would tell the other two operators as soon as we knew.

What if we disappear?

New payments wait for us.

All three guardians prepare every payout before any of them signs, so while we are gone, new payments wait. Nothing is moved: moving the escrow still takes two of the three keys, and each chain enforces that.

Can I bridge real PRL today?

Not yet.

Pearl Swap and our guardian run on test networks only: Pearl testnet2 and Hyperliquid testnet. The guardians refuse mainnet, and no real funds move through the bridge yet.

Is the guardian software audited?

Not yet.

An outside audit of the guardian software comes before real money.

Our role in the 2 of 3

enderpearl.ai/guardian#role

Three guardians, run by different operators, each on its own server with its own keys and its own Pearl node. Any two can sign a payment. We run one of the three, and our say is equal to each of the others.

3 keys, named in the escrow script and on the treasury2 needed
Who leads, payment by paymentIllustrative order
An illustrative order of turns to lead for six payments. Each guardian leads two of the six.
PaymentEnderpearlAnother guardianA third guardian
Payment 12ndLeads3rd
Payment 2Leads3rd2nd
Payment 33rd2ndLeads
Payment 43rdLeads2nd
Payment 52nd3rdLeads
Payment 6Leads2nd3rd
The real order comes from a hash of each payment and each guardian's id. Nobody picks it, and it is worked out afresh for every payment.

An id carries no privilege

Our id, t-mining, is a name and nothing more. The order is worked out afresh for every payment, so no guardian leads first or more often.

The leader proposes, the others check

The guardian whose turn it is builds the payment and proposes it. The other two rebuild it from their own view of both chains and sign only an exact match.

No coordinator

All three work out whose turn it is from the same chain facts, without asking each other. If the leader stalls, the turn passes to the next guardian in that payment's order after a timeout.

Both chains enforce the 2 of 3

enderpearl.ai/guardian#chains

Pearl enforces the escrow's rule, and Hyperliquid enforces the treasury's. The guardian software cannot relax either one. A compromised guardian gives an attacker one signature, and one signature is not a spend.

Pearl · the escrowPearl testnet2

A Taproot output that only its script can spend

The escrow holds the native PRL that backs, one for one, every PRL the bridge has released on Hyperliquid. It sits at a Taproot address, and a Taproot address can be spent two ways: with one key, or with a script it commits to.

Key path
Closed Its key is a point nobody knows the private key for.
Script path
Two signatures from three named keys.

Every Pearl node checks the script. A spend with one signature is an invalid transaction, and the network rejects it.

The script, for engineers

<key 1> OP_CHECKSIG
<key 2> OP_CHECKSIGADD
<key 3> OP_CHECKSIGADD  ours
OP_2 OP_NUMEQUAL
Output
P2TR, script path only. Tapscript leaf, version 0xc0, in BIP 342's k-of-n form.
Internal key
BIP 341's nothing-up-my-sleeve point, 50929b74…803ac0. No private key is known, so the key path is dead.
Key 3
Ours. The configuration lists the guardians as mc-mining, pearl-swap, t-mining, and the script takes their Pearl keys in that order.
Hyperliquid · the treasuryHyperliquid testnet

A multi-signature account, native to the exchange

The treasury holds the supply of the PRL token on Hyperliquid. It is a multi-signature account, built into Hyperliquid itself, and it names the same three guardians.

Signers
Two signatures from the same three guardians.
Creator's key
Refused alone Like every single key, since the account was made 2 of 3.

The exchange refuses any action on the treasury without two signatures, including from the key that created the account. Changing the account itself also takes two of the three guardians.

The account, for engineers

Type
Hyperliquid native multi-signature account, threshold 2 of 3 authorised signers. Our Hyperliquid key is one of the three.

Two signatures prove that two keys agreed. They do not prove the payment was owed, to whom, or that it was not already made. That is the work of the eight checks.

Pearl Swap publishes the escrow and treasury addresses, and each guardian’s Pearl public key, on its Key addresses page. Never send PRL to an address someone gave you. Use the deposit address your own browser checks on Pearl Swap.

How our guardian decides

Eight checks, in order. Then one signature.

Our guardian believes nothing it is told. It runs these eight checks in this order, against its own Pearl node and its own reading of Hyperliquid. Any failure is a refusal with a reason, returned to the proposer and recorded.

enderpearl.ai/guardian#checks
  1. Configuration

    The same rules, matched by hash

    It rejects anything built under a different configuration. The guardian set, the threshold, the fees and the limits are one document all three operators agree on. Its hash is the configuration fingerprint, which Pearl Swap publishes and every guardian reports, so one guardian cannot quietly change a fee or a limit.

    Refuses if

    the proposal was built under any configuration other than ca7ec3a5…

  2. Source

    The source, seen for itself

    It confirms the payment's source exists, on its own Pearl node or its own reading of Hyperliquid. For a deposit: the Pearl output, its amount, its script and 12 confirmations (the test-network setting). For a withdrawal: the transfer in Hyperliquid's own ledger, with its sender and amount.

    Refuses if

    it has not yet seen the source for itself. What that looks like.

  3. Destination

    The destination, from cryptography

    It works out where the money goes from cryptography alone: the Hyperliquid account committed in the deposit script, or the sender's EIP-712 signature bound to that one transfer, checked against the transfer it saw itself. A destination is never taken on the leader's word.

    Refuses if

    the proposed destination differs from the one it derived.

  4. Amounts

    Every amount, recomputed

    It recomputes every amount from the agreed rules and compares. Amounts are counted in grains: 1 PRL is 100,000,000 grains.

    Refuses if

    any amount differs from its own figure.

  5. Payload

    Rebuilt, byte for byte

    It builds the payload itself, the Pearl transaction or the Hyperliquid action, and compares it with the proposal byte for byte. It signs only an exact match. A proposal that lies cannot be reproduced, so it gathers no signatures.

    Refuses if

    a single byte differs.

  6. History

    One payout per source

    It checks its own history. It never signs two payouts for one source that could both execute.

    Refuses if

    it already signed a payout for this source that could still execute.

  7. Reserve

    The reserve still covers what circulates

    PRL circulating on Hyperliquid must stay covered by native PRL in the escrow. It also checks the limits in the configuration: each deposit or withdrawal from 10 PRL to 100 PRL, and releases up to 500 PRL in a rolling hour and 2,000 PRL in a rolling day.

    Refuses if

    the payment is under 10 PRL or over 100 PRL.

    Waits if

    the hourly or daily limit is full. It refuses for now, and signs once the limit has room.

    Pauses if

    the reserve would no longer cover what circulates, on two readings in a row. The first short reading refuses the payment; the second pauses the guardian. It stays paused until a person clears it, and only after its own reading is healthy again.

  8. Record

    Intent first, then the signature

    It writes down its intent to sign, and only then signs. A crash cannot make it forget what it signed.

    Then

    it signs.

One signature of the two needed.

A second guardian must reach the same result on its own view before anything moves.

Refusals are normal. A guardian whose view lags refuses until it catches up.

Upgrades to this software are reviewed by all three operators before anyone deploys.

What a refusal looks like

enderpearl.ai/guardian#refusal

A guardian that has not yet seen a payment’s source refuses it, with a reason, and signs once its own view catches up. Every guardian works this way, ours included.

Check 02, step by step

A guardian signs only for money it has seen for itself.

One withdrawal · an illustration

  1. Proposed

    One guardian proposes a withdrawal.

  2. Refused

    Another refuses it, with the guardian software’s own reason:

    “I have not seen this transfer on Hyperliquid.”

    Check 02 · the source, seen for itself

  3. Confirmed

    Its own reading of Hyperliquid then shows the transfer.

  4. Signed

    Only then does it sign.

It does not take the leader’s word for the transfer. It waits until its own reading of Hyperliquid shows it.

What we hold, and what we never do

enderpearl.ai/guardian#hold

Three keys, made on our own server. Their private halves never leave it.

  • Pearl signing key

    Our share of the escrow on Pearl.

  • Hyperliquid key

    Our share of the treasury on Hyperliquid. Its account is used for signing bridge payouts and nothing else.

  • Identity key

    Signs our messages to the other guardians and the deposit addresses we vouch for. It is kept apart from the two keys that move funds, so constant use never touches them.

Our guardian refuses to start if any of its keys is not the one the configuration names. Pearl Swap publishes the public half of each guardian’s Pearl signing key on its Key addresses page.

Four things

We never

  1. Use our guardian's Hyperliquid account for anything but signing bridge payouts.

  2. Sign or run anything that arrives out of band, by email or by chat, however urgent someone says it is.

  3. Move funds by hand.

  4. Send a private key to anyone. If asked, the answer is no, and the other guardians are told.

Our guardian acts only on what it verifies against its own view of the chains.

Fees, as configured

enderpearl.ai/guardian#fees

Fees live in the shared configuration for epoch 1. No guardian can change one alone, ours included. A changed fee is a changed fingerprint, and every operator sees it.

Fees and limits · epoch 1 · test networks
PaymentAs configured
Moving PRL to Hyperliquid1 PRL flat, whatever the amount. You also pay Pearl’s own network fee to send it.
Moving PRL back to Pearl0.25% plus 0.0001 PRL
Smallest payment10 PRL, so the flat fee cannot swallow a small deposit
Largest payment100 PRL, each deposit or withdrawal
Limits on releases500 PRL in a rolling hour, 2,000 PRL in a rolling day. A payment waits while a limit is full.

For example: 20 PRL moved to Hyperliquid arrives as 19 PRL. 15 PRL moved back pays out 14.9624 PRL on Pearl: a fee of 0.0375 PRL (0.25%) plus 0.0001 PRL. Test-network figures are not a commitment to live fees.

The fee sweep

What the bridge earns leaves the escrow by a separate operation, the fee sweep, to one address named in the configuration and nowhere else. Each guardian works out what was earned by itself, and refuses a leader that asks for more, points elsewhere, or replays a height already swept. It can never take PRL a circulating token is owed.

Deposits out of range can go back

Native PRL sent below the smallest amount, or above the largest, can be returned. The owner of the Hyperliquid account the deposit address commits to signs a return to a Pearl address. Each guardian checks it, and the payout spends the deposit itself, so it can happen once.

When a guardian is down

enderpearl.ai/guardian#liveness

All three guardians prepare every payout before any of them signs. So while any one of them is down, new payments wait, and escrowed funds stay put. Moving funds still takes two of the three keys, and each chain enforces that. This holds whichever guardian is down, ours included.

Guardians answering, and what follows
AnsweringNew paymentsFunds at risk
3 of 3 Proceed. Each payment's leader proposes; all three check it and prepare it before it is signed. Funds at riskNo
2 of 3 Wait. Every payment needs all three to prepare it, so new payments wait for the missing guardian. Escrowed funds stay where they are. Funds at riskNo
1 of 3 Pause. One signature cannot move anything. Escrowed funds stay where they are. Funds at riskNo
0 of 3 Pause. Nothing moves until guardians are back. Escrowed funds stay where they are. Funds at riskNo
Ours, right now Checking reading from your browser
  • A returning guardian rebuilds its view from its own node, then resumes.
  • Each guardian checks its clock against Hyperliquid every ten minutes. While its clock is more than a minute off, it will not sign a new Hyperliquid payout to replace one whose time ran out.
  • The guardian software’s tests stop a guardian at the worst moments, mid-payment included, and require the books to balance to the last unit.
Our guardian's full record

Who would have to do what

enderpearl.ai/guardian#threats

For each case: what it would take, and whether escrowed funds are at risk. The last row is the trust assumption. We state it plainly.

Threats to the escrow: what each would take, and whether funds are at risk
IfWhat it would takeFunds at risk
One guardian's host is compromised, ours or another's The attacker holds one signature. Moving anything would still take a second guardian, and both chains enforce that. Funds at riskNo
A guardian lies when it leads The other two would have to sign a payload they cannot reproduce. They sign only an exact match, so the lie gathers no signatures and the turn passes on a timeout. Funds at riskNo
A guardian is offline, or returns out of date New payments wait for it, since all three prepare every payout. A returning guardian rebuilds from its own node before it acts. Funds at riskNo
A payment is replayed, or a guardian crashes mid-payment Two payouts for one source would both have to execute. Each guardian writes down its intent before it signs and never signs two that could. Funds at riskNo
We are compelled, or we disappear We are one signer of three. Whoever compels us gets one signature at most, and our absence neither moves the escrow nor strands it. Funds at riskNo, not alone
A bug in the guardian software All three guardians run the same code, so one bug could affect all three at once. The chains still require two signatures, but three guardians with the same faulty check could agree on the same mistake. Upgrades are reviewed by all three operators before anyone deploys, and an outside audit comes before real money. Funds at riskPossibly
Two guardians collude Two independent operators would have to act together. Two signatures from three keys is the rule, so they could move the escrow. Funds at riskYes

So the design is worth what the independence of the three guardians is worth. That is why we say which guardian is ours, and why its record is public.

Check it yourself

Read our guardian's own record, and check the keys and addresses where Pearl Swap publishes them.